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One Moment Please: Private Devotion m the Public 
Schools 
Richard G. Wilkins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-five years ago, in the celebrated case of Engel v. Vitale, 1 
the United States Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment precluded the Board of Education of Union Free 
School District No. 9, Hyde Park, New York, from causing the follow-
ing prayer to be said aloud at the beginning of the school day: 
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we 
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
Country. 2 
The Court, per Justice Black, concluded that the practice was unconsti-
tutional because it was "part of a governmental program to further re-
ligious beliefs" that "breach[ed] the constitutional wall of separation 
between Church and State."3 In Karcher v. May, • the Court recently 
faced, but ultimately did not decide,11 whether the New Jersey legisla-
ture violated Engel's constitutional strictures by providing a moment of 
silence at the start of each school day during which students could pon-
der, daydream, meditate, plan a date or - if they chose - pray. 
The question of private devotion in the public schools has been a 
contentious one since the Engel decision. Persons opposed to any offi-
cial recognition of divinity have used the decision to argue for the extir-
pation of all reference to deity from public life.6 On the other hand, the 
• Associate Prof., J. Reuben Clark Law School. 
I. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
2. Id. at 422. 
3. !d. at 425. 
4. 108 S. Ct. 388 (1987). 
5. The Court disposed of Karcher on technical grounds, concluding that the named appellant 
(the former speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly) lacked standing to pursue the appeal. 
The Court thus did not express any opinion on the merits of the suit, although the decision left 
standing two lower court decisions invalidating the New Jersey moment of silence statute. !d. at 
395. 
6. Justice Douglas' concurrence in Engel has been particularly useful in that regard, because 
it suggests that everything from tax deductions for religious charitable contributions to the Na-
tional Anthem, the Pledge of Allegiance and the motto engraved on U.S. currency is unconstitu-
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decision has been used as emotional fodder by radicals of another ilk to 
whip devotees into furious indignation over the banishment of God 
from the classroom.7 The Engel decision - whatever the perspective 
- simply resists receding quietly into the constitutional background. 
The continuing debate over the validity of private devotion in the 
public schools has many facets. The problem can be approached on a 
historical basis. Those who favor a "strict" or "original intent" con-
struction of the Constitution insist that Engel and other Establishment 
Clause decisions are flatly inconsistent with the goals originally animat-
ing the First Amendment. 8 Alternatively, the controversy can be ana-
lyzed somewhat more pragmatically, by focusing not on what the 
Founding Fathers thought or intended, but rather on whether prayer 
and/or moments of silence in the public schools threaten principles 
thought to be fundamental to American democracy.9 This latter ap-
proach is the track taken by the Court during the past several de-
cades.10 But, whatever the analytical approach, I believe that providing 
public school children with a moment of silence during which they can 
ponder, meditate - or even pray - does not transgress the proscrip-
tions of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 
II. A MOMENT OF SILENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Recently, it has been somewhat in vogue for conservative legal 
scholars to attack the historical foundation for the Court's Religion 
Clause cases. 11 The "wall of separation between Church and State," 
upon which Engel and other Establishment Clause decisions are 
based/2 has been decried by Chief Justice Rehnquist, for one, as a 
"metaphor based on bad history . . . which has proved useless as a 
guide to judging."13 Indeed, the problems with the church-state wall 
become apparent upon even cursory examination. 
tiona!. 370 U.S. at 437-442 and accompanying notes (Douglas, .J ., concurring). See McConnell, 
You Can't Tell the Players in Church-State Disputes Without a Scorecard, 10 HARV. J.L. & 
PuB. Pm.'Y 27, 28-29 (1987). See also R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PuBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION 
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984). 
7. See, e.g., Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious 
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 6 (1986) (asserting that "[i]t is generally the 
religious right that demands government support for religion"). 
8. E.g., Wallace v . .Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
9. E.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 425-433. 
10. E.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
11. Professor Laycock labels such scholars as the "religious right." Laycock, supra note 7, at 
7. 
12. Engel, 370 U.S. at 425. 
13. 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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In the first place, -Thomas Jefferson - the first person to use the 
wall construct14 - was out of the country at the time the First Amend-
ment was debated and adopted. He is, accordingly, a "less than ideal 
source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment." 111 Moreover, the records of the de-
bates surrounding the drafting of the First Amendment suggest that the 
primary concerns of the Founding Fathers were to prevent establish-
ment of a national church and the preference of one religious sect over 
another. 16 They did not set out to construct a wall that would preclude 
any government acknowledgement of or even generalized aid to reli-
gion.17 Indeed, it is quite clear that the drafters of the First Amend-
ment did not intend to prohibit limited governmental endorsement of 
religion. One day after the House of Representative voted to adopt the 
form of the First Amendment that was ultimately ratified, it passed a 
resolution asking George Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Day 
proclamation.18 
Thus, the men who drafted and adopted the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment almost certainly did not perceive in it a "wall" 
that would prohibit school children from voluntarily acknowledging 
their "dependence" upon God or begging his "blessings upon us, our 
parents, our teachers and our Country."19 It follows a fortiori that they 
would not consider a moment of silence statute, which merely provides 
a moment for meditation or prayer by those who want to pray, uncon-
stitutional. A moment of silence ceremony (or even a voluntary, non-
denominational prayer, such as that involved in Engel), which does not 
seriously threaten creation of a state church or evidence hostility to any 
particular creed, seems fairly far removed from the core concerns that 
prompted enactment of the First Amendment. 2° From a historical or 
"original intent" viewpoint, therefore, the constitutionality of a moment 
14. The "wall of separation" is generally credited to jefferson, who used the phrase in a 
ceremonial letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. ld. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
15. /d. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
16. /d. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
17. /d. at 98-99. 
18. Elias Boudinot, the congressman who proposed the resolution, stated on the floor of the 
House that he " 'could not think of letting the session pass over without offering an opportunity to 
all the citizens of the United States of joining with one voice, in returning to Almighty God their 
sincere thanks for the many blessings he had poured down upon them.'" 472 U.S. at 101 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 914 (1789)). 
19. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. 
20. Cf McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 146, 163 
(1986) (suggesting that even the non-denominational prayer in Engel favors "one religion or 
group of religions - probably the majority's - over the others"). 
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of silence provision, such as that enacted by the New Jersey legislature, 
should be unquestionable. 
It is, however, quite unlikely that the moment of silence debate 
will be settled by pointing out the faulty historical footing of Engel. 
Two terms ago, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 21 the Supreme Court expressly 
rejected a strict historical approach to the Establishment Clause. There, 
the United States District Court for the District of Alabama had up-
held the constitutionality of a statute that explicitly returned prayer to 
the public schools on the ground that the Supreme Court had erred in 
Engel and other cases by applying the strictures of the First Amend-
ment to the states.22 As a pure historical matter, the district court was 
probably correct - the Founding Fathers did not intend the Religion 
Clauses to apply to the states, as evidenced by the persistence of state-
established churches in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maryland 
and Rhode Island well into the Nineteenth Century.23 But, despite the 
fact that the district court's opinion straightened out some sloppy schol-
arship in previous Supreme Court opinions, the High Court summarily 
affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the lower court's holding. 24 
The writers of the Establishment Clause may never have dreamed 
that preventing the federal government from establishing a national 
church would in turn hobble the states, but "original intent" is no 
longer controlling in this sensitive area of constitutionallaw. 2~ The Su-
preme Court began applying various provisions of the Bill of Rights to 
the states late last century ,26 and it is simply too late in the day to 
abandon that course.27 Indeed, most ordinary citizens would be shocked 
at the mere suggestion that, although the federal government could not 
establish a church, their state legislatures could. Thus, the current con-
troversy over a moment of silence in the public schools likely will not 
be resolved by pointing out to the Supreme Court that its decision in 
Engel would receive a failing grade if submitted as a paper in a consti-
tutional history course. 28 
21. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
22. Jaffree also involved a moment of silence statute, discussed below. Notes 58-60 and ac-
companying text, infra. 
23. Jajjree, 472 U.S. at 99 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
24. /d. at 48-49. 
25. /d. at 81 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the Court "must employ both history 
and reason in [its] analysis"). 
26. E.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1883). 
27. The Jaffree Court emphasized "how firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence 
is the proposition that the several states have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States." 472 U.S. at 48-
49. 
28. See McConnell, supra note 20, at 163 (arguing why, even from the perspective of a 
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III. A MoMENT oF SILENCE IN THE MoDERN CouRT 
Rather than take a strictly historical approach to Establishment 
Clause issues, the modern Court has analyzed several pragmatic factors 
to determine whether particular governmental action unduly involves 
the church or state in the affairs of the other. Indeed, only one case 
decided during the past 20 years, Marsh v. Chambers, 29 has used a 
strict historical analysis of an Establishment Clause issue.30 
Instead, beginning with its 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 31 the Court has quite regularly applied a three-pronged test to 
determine the constitutionality of governmental activities ranging from 
providing bus transportation to parochial school students32 to erecting a 
Christmas Creche in a city park.33 Under that test, governmental ac-
tions challenged under the Establishment Clause must meet the follow-
ing criteria: 
First, the [action] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; finally, [it] must not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement with religion. " 34 
The Court's application of the Lemon factors has been fairly con-
sistent. However, because state action must meet all three prongs before 
it passes constitutional muster, and because the proper application of 
the three elements to concrete facts is almost always debatable, the re-
sults obtained from the Lemon test can only be described as spotty and 
scholar who supports government accommodation of religious practice, "there should be no gov-
ernment-sponsored religious exercises (vocal prayers, Bible study as scripture) in the public 
schools"). 
29. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
30. On the basis of long acceptance and the similar practice of the first national Congress, 
the Court in Marsh upheld the constitutionality of Nebraska's practice of paying a chaplain to 
open each state legislative session with prayer. 
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
32. Wolman v. Walter, 433. U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977). 
33. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
34. 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
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inconsistent.36 But, despite the difficulties of the Lemon test, no major-
ity of the Court has shown great enthusiasm for abandoning it. 36 
Application of the Lemon test to a moment of silence statute is 
problematic. Depending upon the predilections of individual jurists, a 
simple moment of silence can be viewed as violating all or none of the 
Lemon factors. The district court in Karcher v. May, for example, con-
cluded that the New Jersey moment of silence statute violated all three 
prongs of the test. 37 Moreover, although the State urged before the trial 
court that a moment of silence had the secular purpose of providing a 
"transition" between non-school and school activities, and supported 
that assertion with significant testimony by experienced educators and 
other experts, the trial court rejected that proffered purpose as an "af-
ter the fact rationalization."38 The district court made this finding de-
spite its recognition that "a brief period of silence serves a transition 
purpose."39 It further found that a moment of silence had the "effect" 
of advancing religion by "mandat[ing] a period at the start of each 
school day when all students would have an opportunity to engage in 
prayer."4° Finally, the court found that the statute was unduly "entan-
gling" because a "required minute of silence would put children and 
35. Even that description may be overly charitable. Chief Justice Rehnquist has recently 
described the conflicting and seemingly unprincipled results of Lemon in the following synopsis of 
the Court's Establishment Clause cases: 
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps 
of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in 
geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may 
not lend a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A 
State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in which the paro-
chial school children write, thus rendering them non-reusable. A State may pay for bus 
transportation to religious schools, but may not pay for bus transportation from the 
parochial school to the public zoo or a natural history museum for a field trip. A State 
may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic ser-
vices must be given in a different building; speech and hearing "services" conducted by 
the State inside the sectarian school are forbidden ... but [not] ... diagnostic testing . 
. A State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of State-
written tests and state-ordered reporting services, but it may not provide funds for 
teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. Religious instruction may not be given in 
public school, but the public school may release students during the day for religion 
classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy laws. 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 38 at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Such 
results are hard to justify on anything other than an ad hoc basis. 
36. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
37. 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1572 (D.N.J. 1983) (decided sub nom May v. Cooperman) (herein-
after Karcher v. May). 
38. !d. at 1571. 
39. Id. at 1570. 
40. !d. at 1571. 
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parents who believed in prayer in the public schools against children 
and parents who do not."41 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, apply-
ing the same legal test, disagreed with virtually all of the district court's 
reasoning.42 The court of appeals rejected the holding that the statute 
violated the "effects" test simply by "designating a time and a place 
when children and teachers may pray."43 "The state," the court of ap-
peals reasoned, "equally injects itself into religious matters when it 
designates a time and place when children and teachers may not 
pray."44 The court similarly rejected the notion that the statute was 
impermissibly "entangling" because of its potential for divisiveness. 
Noting the reality that any governmental action to accommodate reli-
gious belief will upset someone, the court of appeals wrote that "[i]f 
political divisiveness were the test for entanglement, no governmental 
accommodation of religion would survive Establishment [Clause] scru-
tiny."4~ But, despite its well-reasoned conclusion that the moment of 
silence statute did not violate the "effects" and "entanglement" prongs 
of Lemon, the court of appeals affirmed the district court on the ground 
that the asserted secular purpose for the statute was "pretextual."46 
The question whether the New Jersey moment of silence statute 
has a secular "purpose" is not readily answered. In a lengthy concur-
ring opinion to a decision invalidating Bible reading in the public 
schools, handed down the year following Engel, Justice Brennan sug-
gested that states could avoid violating the Establishment Clause but 
still accommodate the desires of those students who want to pray by 
providing for a brief moment of silence at the start of each school day.47 
Such a ceremony, he suggested, would serve the "solely secular ends" of 
"fostering harmony and tolerance among the pupils, enhancing the au-
thority of the teacher, and inspiring better discipline."48 
By making the apparently sensible suggestion that a state could 
serve a secular purpose and still accommodate the religious needs of its 
students by adopting a moment of silence ceremony, Justice Brennan 
set up a subtle "Catch 22" that was seized upon by the district court in 
Karcher to invalidate the New Jersey statute. The district court in 
Karcher acknowledged that a moment of silence may have a secular 
41. /d. at 1575. 
42. May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d. Cir. 1985). 
43. /d. at 249. 
44. /d. 
45. /d. at 247. 
46. /d. at 251-52. 
47. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 280 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
48. /d. 
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purpose. 49 However, because it is also adopted to facilitate religious 
practice, to provide a "period at the start of each school day when all 
students would have an opportunity to engage in prayer,"110 the secular 
purpose ipso facto converts to a sectarian purpose: the accommodation 
of prayer. 111 The court of appeals in Karcher, moreover, refused to find 
its way out of this box. Indeed, the court explicitly noted that the New 
Jersey statute did not endorse or encourage prayer and that the only 
possible sectarian "purpose" for the moment of silence was to accom-
modate the desires of those who wanted to pray.112 Nevertheless, the 
court of appeals refused to release the state from the logical conundrum 
created by the trial court. A moment of silence may have a secular 
purpose, but because it also has the purpose of accommodating religious 
belief, it is constitutionally infirm.113 
The "heads you lose, tails I win" reasoning of the lower courts in 
Karcher could have been easily rectified by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court's prior cases applying the "purpose" prong of Lemon 
establish that a statute need not have "exclusively secular" objectives to 
pass constitutional muster.114 The New Jersey legislature need only 
have "a secular purpose";1111 the fact that a moment of silence accommo-
dates religious belief in addition to providing a secular transition pe-
riod from non-school to school life should be constitutionally irrelevant. 
But, while this approach to the "purpose" prong avoids the logical 
traps of the lower courts' analysis, it too is troubling. If indeed all that 
is needed under Lemon's "purpose" test is a plausible secular purpose, 
and any such purpose will do, there is very little substance left to the 
inquiry. Human ingenuity being what it is, state or national legisla-
tures will have little difficulty articulating some plausible secular goal 
for almost any undertaking - no matter how entwined with matters of 
religion. Although most such actions would probably run afoul of one 
of the other Lemon prongs - effect or entanglement - the fact re-
mains that merely requiring "a" secular purpose renders the "purpose" 
test a virtual dead letter.116 Yet the alternative, exemplified by the logi-
49. 572 F. Supp. at 1570 (noting that a moment of silence "serves a transition purpose"). 
50. /d. at 1571. 
51. /d. at 1572-73. 
52. Cooperman, 780 F.2d at 252. 
53. /d. at 252-53. 
54. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 680-81 and n.6 (citing numerous cases). 
55. /d. at 680 (emphasis added). 
56. Jajfree, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("If the purpose prong is intended to 
void those aids to sectarian institutions accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid religion, 
the prong will condemn nothing so long as the legislature utters a secular purpose and says noth-
ing about religion"). 
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cal juggernaut created by the lower courts in Karcher, where any plau-
sible sectarian purpose is fatal, is equally unacceptable. 
Faced with the above legal realities, I have concluded that the 
Lemon test does not promote thoughtful constitutional analysis of mo-
ment of silence statutes. Such statutes, as the court of appeals in 
Karcher noted, should readily pass muster under the "effect" and "en-
tanglement" prongs.117 But the ease with which those factors are 
manipulated to support the contrary result - as shown by the district 
court's opinion in Karcher - is troublesome. And, the question 
whether such statutes have a "secular purpose" may not be worth ask-
ing. The answer will always depend upon the point from which the 
questioner begins, and the selection of that starting point will always be 
little more than an ipse dixit. 
IV. THE CoRE CoNCERNS: CoERCION AND DEBILITATION oF 
GovERNMENT AND RELIGION 
Because of the difficulties inherent in the consistent and reasoned 
application of the Lemon test, the validity of a moment of silence stat-
ute should not depend, in the final analysis, upon a rote inquiry into 
purpose, effect and entanglement. Rather, the constitutional question 
should turn upon whether such a statute transgresses the fundamental 
concerns that led the Court to invalidate the recitation of a school 
prayer in Engel. There, the Court was troubled primarily by a pre-
scribed prayer's coercion of the individual right of conscience, and its 
concomitant debilitation of both government and religion. Moment of 
silence statutes which accommodate religious sentiment, but which do 
not coerce individual conscience or debilitate religious expression, 
should pass constitutional muster. 
In striking down state-prescribed prayers, the Court wrote that 
"[ w ]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is 
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure 
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially ap-
proved religion is plain."118 The Court further noted that "a union of 
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade 
religion." A neutral moment of silence provision, however, does not 
pose any serious threat to individual conscience or the essential auton-
omy of church and state.119 Perhaps more importantly, the provision of 
an opportunity for private contemplation or introspection facilitates the 
57. Cooperman, 780 F.2d at 247-49. 
58. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
59. McConnell, supra note 20, at 163. 
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exercise of individual rights.60 The Establishment Clause should not 
preclude governmental accommodation of the felt need of many persons 
for voluntary religious expression. 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Jaffree summarily invali-
dated a statute that provided for the recitation of a state-sponsored 
prayer. It also invalidated a moment of silence provision enacted by the 
State of Alabama. It did so, however, only because the legislative his-
tory of the statute, as well as its relationship to another moment of 
silence provision in the state, demonstrated that the provision's sole 
purpose was to return prayer to the public schools. The principal legis-
lative sponsor of the Alabama statute, for example, testified that he had 
no other purpose for the statute other "than returning voluntary prayer 
to the public schools."61 Moreover, the statute invalidated in Jaffree, 
which provided a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary 
prayer," was enacted despite the presence of an earlier statute that au-
thorized a moment of silence for "meditation."62 In such circumstances, 
the Court concluded that the statute was "enacted to convey a message 
of State endorsement and promotion of prayer."63 Because such an "en-
dorsement" could have the effect of intimidating or coercing those who 
chose not to pray, the statute suffered the defect found fatal in Engel. 
Other moment of silence statutes, so long as they neither en-
courage nor discourage prayer, should not suffer the same constitu-
tional infirmities. The New Jersey statute, for example, provided: 
Principals and teachers in each public elementary and secondary 
school of each school district in this State shall permit students to 
observe a 1 minute period of silence to be used solely at the discretion 
of the individual student, before the opening exercise of each school 
day for quiet and private contemplation or introspection.64 
Such statutes do not create the same dangers as the recitation of a state-
prescribed prayer. Unlike the established prayer in Engel, neutral mo-
ment of silence statutes protect "both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all"; they plainly are not "an instru-
ment for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view [an 
individual] finds unacceptable."611 Such statutes, moreover, do not dis-
rupt the essential autonomy of church and state. 
First, neutral moment of silence statutes are permissive only. They 
60. Id. at 151, 161-67. 
61. jaffree, 472 U.S. at 57. 
62. Id. at 59, 61. 
63. !d. at 59. 
64. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-4 (West 1982). 
65. Jaffree, 372 U.S. at 51. 
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do not require that students do anything other than remain silent -
they need not close their eyes, bow their heads, or assume any posture 
suggestive of religion or irreligion. Second, the language of statutes is 
absolutely neutral as to religion. Prayer is not even mentioned. Third, 
in contrast to the Alabama moment of silence statute, a truly neutral 
statute is not enacted exclusively to promote prayer. Several New 
Jersey legislators, for example, suggested that a moment of silence is 
provided "to help restore order in the classroom."66 Finally, unlike the 
prayer at issue in Engel, a moment of silence does not involve the state 
- or the church - in religious indoctrination of any kind. Thus, on 
their face, such statutes do not run afoul of the evils identified in Engel: 
they cannot coerce individual conscience because they do not require 
any particular thought; they do not interfere with church-state auton-
omy because they do not contemplate the involvement of either entity in 
the affairs of the other. 67 
Moreover, unlike the situation in Engel, there is good reason to 
conclude that a moment of silence facilitates rather than inhibits the 
exercise and enjoyment of precious individual liberties such as the free 
exercise of religion. Some have occasionally suggested that, because 
compulsory attendance at public school effectively precludes many op-
portunities for personal prayer, a moment of silence to accommodate 
such activity is not only permissible but is in fact constitutionally re-
quired by the Free Exercise Clause (which, of course, prohibits govern-
ment from interfering with the free exercise of religion). The Court in 
Jaffree suggested that such an argument is weak.68 But, even though 
the state may be under no constitutional command to provide an oppor-
tunity for private prayer, the free exercise argument cannot be ignored. 
The provision of a moment of silence in the context of a public school 
- a structured, compulsory state institution where contemplative op-
portunities are limited - necessarily furthers values protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause.69 As Justice Brennan has noted, "even when the 
66. Robert G. Seidenstein, The Star Ledger, December 14, 1982 (quoting Assemblywoman 
Angela Perun). See also Jim Goodman, The Trenton Times, December 14, 1982; John Shure, 
The Bergen Record, December 14, 1982; Nancy Freiberg, The Courier-Post, December 14, 1982; 
Robert G. Seidenstein, The Star Ledger, December 17, 1982; Jill Pollack, The Trenton Times, 
December 3, 1982. 
67. See McConnell, supra note 20, at 163, 154 (governmental provisions accommodating the 
religious practices of students should be constitutional so long as "they involve no pressure upon 
unwilling students to participate ... if they are genuinely neutral among the beliefs present in the 
school population" and do not "interfere with the autonomy of religious life"). 
68. 472 U.S. at 59, n.45. 
69. Justice O'Connor, for one, has recognized that, in some circumstances, the free exercise 
clause requires some modification of "the standard Establishment Clause text." Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Professor McConnell has forcefully argued that free exercise 
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government is not compelled to do so by the Free Exercise Clause, it 
may to some extent act to facilitate the opportunities of individuals to 
practice their religion."70 
State efforts to facilitate opportunities for voluntary, private devo-
tion in the public schools should be sustained so long as they do not -
as in Engel - infringe upon "the individual's freedom to choose his 
own creed."71 A statute which simply "permit[s]" a moment for "quiet 
and private contemplation or introspection" at the sole "discretion of 
the individual student"72 is neutral among religions and between reli-
gion and nonreligion. Such a statute neither favors one religion over 
another, nor "conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval of reli-
gion."73 As with the released-time religious study program upheld 35 
years ago in Zorach v. Clauson, 74 a simple moment of silence leaves 
students to their "own desires as to . . . [their] religious devotions, if 
any."75 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The Court in Jaffree noted that an attempt "to return prayer to 
the public schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting 
every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropri-
ate moment of silence during the schoolday."76 The Court has also 
noted that, "[i]n our modern, complex society, whose traditions and 
constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and plu-
ralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the Establish-
ment Clause is simplistic."77 The fundamental goal of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment should not become the removal of all 
traces of religion from public life.78 On the contrary, the Constitution 
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all re-
values must be given some scope in determining the constitutionality of moment of silence provi-
sions because, in the context of a public school, "there can be no religious element in the absence 
of government accommodation." McConnell, supra note 20, at 166. 
70. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
71. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 52. 
72. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36-4 (West 1982). 
73. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 61. 
74. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
75. /d. at 311. 
76. 472 U.S. at 72. 
77. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 678. 
78. We are, unfortunately, rather close to that goal at the present time. McConnell, supra 
note 20, at 162 and n.70 ("references to religion have been removed systematically from public 
school education") (citing 3 RELIGION AND Soc'y REPORT, No. 11 at 8 (Nov. 1986)); C. 
HAYNt:S, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1985); P. Vrrz, REI.IGION AND TRADI-
TIONAL VA LUES IN PUBI.IC SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1985 ). 
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ligions, and forbids hostility towards any."79 By providing school chil-
dren with the opportunity for voluntary, private introspection at the 
start of each school day, state legislatures do not transgress constitu-
tional limits. Rather, as the Supreme Court noted in Zorach, by "ad-
justing the schedule of public events to sectarian needs" they "follow 
the best of our traditions."80 
79. Lynrh v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 673. 
80. 343 U.S. at 314. 
